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ABSTRACT 
 
Sovereign debt crises are harmful reoccurring economic phenomena and 
the subject of how best to achieve sovereign debt sustainability is therefore of 
paramount importance. For decades economists have struggled to find a robust 
and consistent means of assessing sovereign debt sustainability. This paper 
argues that our understanding of sovereign debt sustainability can be enhanced 
by viewing this subject through the dual lenses of political economy and 
economic history. These two perspectives help identify seven distinct 
mechanisms for achieving sovereign debt sustainability. It is important to 
understand each of these methods as countries can, and often do, pursue 
multiple strategies in their efforts to achieve debt sustainability. Sovereign debt 
sustainability is often as much a political as an economic challenge with 
competing internal and external dimensions. 
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Introduction and Background 
The economic harm inflicted by too much debt has been well 
documented.1 During the past several decades almost all sovereign debt 
problems2 occurred in developing countries.3 Prior to the current crisis, the last 
significant sovereign debt bout occurred around the turn of the 21st century 
when an all too familiar pattern was repeated: one developing economy after 
another suffered a financial crisis, leading to several sovereign defaults.4 Since 
then many developing economies have achieved comparatively low debt-to-
income levels (Figure 1) while concurrently stockpiling significant reserves.5 (See 
Figure 1) 
In contrast to the experience of many emerging and developing countries 
over the last half-century, some claim that the last time an advanced economy 
defaulted was over six decades ago.6 However, in the past several years many 
advanced countries have assumed significant debts with today’s levels matched 
only by the periods following the two world wars (Figure 2).7 At present, a 
number of advanced economies find themselves either unable to obtain 
financing at sustainable rates of interest or largely shut out of the capital 
markets.8(See Figure 2). 
 
 
                                                 
1 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, pp. 223-239) 
2 In this paper ‘sovereign debt sustainability’ refers to whether a government can service its public 
debt (pay interest and principal) while also meeting agreed upon terms (e.g., payment deadlines). 
Sustainability in today’s world, where a significant portion of public debt is regularly ‘rolled over’ 
in markets, is linked to confidence in the sovereign’s ability and commitment to continue 
meeting its obligations. 
3 Examples of recent emerging market sovereign defaults include Mexico’s in August 1982, 
which was followed shortly thereafter by Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, the Philippines, Turkey and 
others. The late-1980s saw several Latin-American countries default again (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009, pp. 18, 96) 
4 Both Russia (1998) and Argentina (2001) defaulted, with Argentina’s roughly 75% ‘haircut’ on 
$100 billion in debt representing the largest sovereign default in history at that time (Porzecanski 
2010). 
5 (Dominguez, Hashimoto, and Ito 2011; Blanchard, Faruqee, and Klyuev 2009) China’s 
approximately $3 trillion in foreign reserves receive wide publicity. However, less well known is 
the fact that Russia, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, India, Thailand, Algeria, Mexico, Malaysia and Indonesia 
also hold reserves comparable to or in excess of many advanced countries (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2010). 
6 (Milne 2012) 
7 A perhaps important distinction between today’s debt levels, which are roughly in line with 
World War I but still below World War II levels, is that they occurred largely in the absence of 
major global wars. Large government debts have previously been the result of large-scale 
conflicts and their aftermath (Ritschl and Centre for Economic Policy 1996). This distinction may 
influence the degree of social commitment to service government debt (James 2011). 
8 Further complicating the current debt picture is the dramatic increase in private debt levels, 
particularly those of financial institutions and households. Such private debts can often turn into 
public debts, as was the case with Ireland’s recent bank bailouts (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011).  
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Literature Overview 
A vast literature on sovereign debt sustainability has developed over the 
last several decades. However, such research has generally examined advanced 
countries from the creditor rather than debtor perspective due to the 
aforementioned paucity of debt sustainability problems amongst advanced 
economies in recent decades. This perhaps poses some limits on the usefulness 
of previous sovereign debt research to today’s challenges given the significant 
socio-political and institutional differences which exist between developing and 
advanced economies. A perhaps more fundamental problem is posed by the lack 
of a generally agreed upon quantitative framework for assessing sovereign debt 
sustainability.9 This is not to say that there are no quantitative measures available 
for evaluating the safety of sovereign debt levels; a wide mix of ratios and 
figures are presently utilized to assess the debt position of nations.10 However, it 
is unclear how much importance or weight should be assigned to these 
measures. Further, attempts to compare some measures across different 
countries and define consistent rules for debt sustainability have proven 
problematic.11 
The objective of this paper is not to describe the various ways in which a 
sovereign debt sustainability problem can arise but to instead outline the 
different mechanisms which exist for addressing an unsustainable level of debt. 
Some economists identify four or five sovereign debt reduction options, and 
these frameworks are often presented as collectively exhaustive.12 This paper 
argues that from both a political economy and economic history perspective that 
seven distinct mechanisms are available to most advanced economies for 
achieving debt sustainability. 
 
 
                                                 
9 (Neck and Sturm 2008, p. 1) This is due to the difficulty posed by understanding and modeling 
creditor perceptions, a sovereign’s ability and or willingness to repay its debt, and other factors. 
10 Some of the more commonly referenced indicators are: i) the nation’s debt-to-income ratio; ii)  
the government’s primary budget balance (whether there is a deficit or surplus before interest 
expense is accounted for); iii) GDP growth rate compared to the rate of interest paid on 
government debt; iv) the average time to maturity of the total government debt portfolio 
(Economist 2010).  
11 For example, at present Portugal’s debt-to-income ratio is approximately 60%, which is in line 
or below that of the U.S., Germany, Belgium, and the UK. During the current crisis these latter 
countries have thus far not encountered any difficulties in the public debt capital markets. 
However, Portugal cannot find private financing at a sustainable rate of interest. Compare and 
contrast the case of Portugal with Japan, which has a debt-to-income ratio of approximately 220% 
yet also enjoys one of the lowest borrowing rates of any sovereign. A commonly cited 
explanation for the financing difficulties encountered by Portugal’s government is the country’s 
relatively low rate of economic growth. 
12 (Buiter 1985, p. 22; Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011, pp. 1-2; Sbrancia 2011, p. 1; Nasar 2011, pp. 
220-1; Taylor 2011, p. 49). Buiter lists four methods for reducing sovereign debt; Reinhart et. al. 
five. 
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The seven mechanisms 
What follows is an overview of the seven distinct mechanisms for 
achieving sovereign debt sustainability and a discussion of their respective 
political economy tradeoffs. (This framework has been summarized in Table 1.) 
1. Economic growth can reduce a nation’s public debt to income ratio, 
perhaps the most closely watched measure of sovereign debt 
sustainability. An expansion in a nation’s products and services typically 
generates additional tax revenue without necessitating an increase in tax 
rates. 13 This aspect of economic growth makes it particularly desirable for 
many policymakers. 14 Some argue that historically economic growth is the 
only means by which large debt burden relief has been successful.15 While 
economic growth is often a popular solution to a debt problem, there is 
considerable debate about how best to achieve growth. Further, recent 
research suggests that countries with high debt-to-income levels may 
have difficulty achieving robust economic growth.16 In addition, 
considerable debate exists over just how much influence policymakers 
have on economic growth and the timeframe required to affect 
meaningful change. 
 
2. Financial aid to sovereign nations can take many different forms. One 
common means by which governments attempt to address a sovereign 
debt problem is by securing additional funding for investment and 
consumption to stimulate economic growth. Such ‘bridge’ financing can 
help countries weather temporary economic downturns.17 Since World 
                                                 
13 For most countries Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product, which excludes the 
profits of foreign residents and corporations, are nearly identical. However, present day Ireland, 
which is home for the regional headquarters and operations of many foreign companies, is a 
notable exception. An estimated 20% of GDP is generated by ‘ghost corporations’ and 
considered un-taxable under present Irish law (Johnson 2010, 2010). In such cases growth in 
GNP would be a more useful measure than GDP in evaluating debt sustainability. 
14 Economic growth does have its critics. For an overview of alternative perspectives see 
‘Rethinking the Growth Imperative’ (Rogoff 2012) 
15 Indeed, a popular misconception is that countries resolved their large World War II debts 
through economic growth. This narrative, however, is at best incomplete and in some cases 
inaccurate. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, writing in the UK’s Guardian, stated “There are lessons 
from history here, too. The big public debts of many countries when the second world war 
ended caused huge anxieties, but the burden diminished rapidly thanks to fast economic growth.” 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/22/euro-europes-democracy-rating-agencies.  
(Sen 2011) However, Buiter (1985) and Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) have demonstrated that 
inflation and financial repression, respectively, played a significant role in the reduction in post-
World War II sovereign debt burdens for many countries. In the UK, for example, the debt 
reduction effects of economic growth and fiscal deficits canceled each other out following World 
War II, leaving the reduction in debt levels explained by inflation. For a decomposition analysis of 
the decline in the UK’s national debt-income ratio from 1948-84 see (Buiter 1985, pp. 18-19). 
16 (Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff 2010; Kumar, Woo, and 
International Monetary 2010) Greece has recently struggled to grow its economy while battling 
unsustainable debt levels. In 2011 it is estimated the Greek economy, even with substantial 
foreign aid, actually shrank 7%. 
17 (Krugman 1988) 
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War II international lending organizations, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), have played a central role in coordinating foreign 
credit for countries in debt distress.18 However, the practice of saddling an 
already highly indebted nation with even more debt is controversial.19 
Both grants and debt forgiveness can immediately aid a country’s return 
to a sustainable debt position and are perhaps a not surprisingly popular 
form of financial aid with debtor countries.20 An agreement by creditors 
to lengthen the repayment schedule, referred to sometimes as a ‘payment 
holiday’ or ‘bisque’21, can also provide a country with additional time to 
reestablish debt service. All such forms of financial aid, however, are 
rarely, if ever, provided with only financial strings attached. For example, 
IMF loans are typically contingent on the recipient implementing 
economic and political reforms and include regular IMF auditing to ensure 
compliance. While IMF programs are aimed at improving economic 
efficiency and competitiveness to help ensure repayment, they often 
prove unpopular with some political constituencies.22 
 
3. Fiscal adjustment can reduce deficits and debt levels by decreasing 
government expenditure and or increasing tax revenue. Such adjustments, 
however, can be very unpopular amongst those affected and difficult to 
implement. Further, sovereign debt crises often strike during periods of 
economic weakness, or precisely when Keynesian demand management 
theory argues that government should be stimulating the economy by 
spending more or reducing taxes.23 However, such government efforts to 
stimulate the economy may run up against resistance from creditors who 
view the sovereign as already overly-indebted. A loss in the confidence of 
creditors over the sovereign’s commitment and or ability to service its 
debt can result in a sudden increase in debt expense, which would further 
exacerbate the debt sustainability challenge. 
 
4. Asset sales can help balance the government ledger. Many governments 
own substantial domestic and foreign assets, and throughout history real 
                                                 
18 Governments also lend to each on other on a bilateral (e.g., 1946 Anglo-American Loan) and 
regional basis (2010 European Financial Stability Fund). Sovereign funding can also be provided 
by banks and other private or quasi-private institutions (e.g., pension funds). 
19 For example, the providers of foreign aid to Greece have been accused of ‘throwing good 
money after bad’ as one version of the IMF-EU-ECB program calls for Greece’s debt-to-GDP rise 
significantly from (at the time of this writing) 130% to 160%. 
20 (Bulow and Rogoff 1989; Neumayer 2002) For example, in 1947 both Australia and New 
Zealand forgave a portion (£38 million) of what Britain owed those countries on debt related to 
World War II. U.S. Marshall Plan funding for Western Europe in 1948 was a form of grant aid. 
21 For example, in 1956-57 the UK negotiated an amendment to the American loan which 
allowed the country to ‘take a bisque’, meaning it could elect to suspend payments of principal 
and interest in any year, up to seven times, during the remaining life of the loan. (Cosío-Pascal 
and Bankruptcy 2006, p. 7). 
22 (Blustein 2005; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004, p. 162; Blustein 2003) 
23 (Keynes 1936; Krugman 2009) 
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estate, bullion, and even warships have been sold to pay off debts.24 In 
addition to paying down public debt, it has been argued that the sale of 
state-owned enterprises may also help improve economic efficiency and 
growth.25 However, liquidating national treasure to pay off creditors can 
provoke political controversy, particularly when such creditors are foreign. 
Further, national assets often generate reoccurring revenue which could 
be lost in the event of a sale, making the challenge of servicing the debt 
even more difficult. Selling government assets may also prove a relatively 
slow process, while a rushed ‘fire sale’ is also unappealing. Even if a state 
was able to realize the full value of assets available for sale the proceeds 
may only reduce the state’s debts by a small fraction.26 It may also prove 
difficult to reacquire – either through trade or nationalization – any state 
assets which have been sold at a future date, particularly ones which 
reside (or can be moved) outside the country’s borders. All of these 
factors combine to make the sale of state assets perhaps one of the least 
attractive options for managing sovereign debt sustainability. However, 
asset sales can often play an important psychological role in signaling to 
creditors a commitment by the sovereign to continue servicing its debt. 
 
5.  Inflation surprise, referred to by some as the government’s ‘trump 
card’27, can significantly reduce the real burden of sovereign debt in a 
relatively short timeframe.28 However, if creditors observe (or simply 
suspect) substantial inflation then large-scale capital flight may commence 
and thereby negate some of the debt reduction benefits of inflation. 
Hence the need for surprise. Political instability often accompanies high 
inflation regardless of whether or not controls which inhibit capital 
movement are in place.29 Importantly, inflation only reduces the real 
                                                 
24 The U.S.’s purchase of the Louisiana territory from Napoleonic France is one of the more 
famous sovereign asset sales. Less well known was the UK Treasury’s sale of British Imperial 
Tobacco shares in the U.S. in February 1940, which the U.S. insisted as prerequisite for obtaining 
Lend-Lease support (Skidelsky 2000, pp. 75-76). 
25 (MacKenzie 1998; Megginson and Netter 2001) 
26 For example, the U.S. Treasury currently lists total federal non-defense related assets at a book 
value of $233 billion, a figure which may in fact be significantly understated. However, if this 
figure was quadrupled and everything sold the proceeds would still only amount to less than 10% 
of the approximately $15 trillion in U.S. public debt. (Ferguson 2011) 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/02/21/america-should-sell-national-assets-to-
balance-the-books.html 
27 (Stella, International Monetary Fund, and Exchange Affairs 1997, p. 11) 
28 This is accomplished through a process termed ‘debt monetization’, which is the purchase and 
retirement of sovereign debt by the central bank (Mishkin 2007). Seigniorage can also generate 
revenue for the government, which can reduce the real value of debt burdens. However, Buiter 
(1985) shows that “the maximum possible yield of this tax is also small” (Buiter 1985, p. 26).  
29 1923 Weimar Germany (annual percentage inflation of 2.22E +10), 1989 Argentina (annual 
percentage inflation of 3,080), and 1946 Hungary (annual percentage inflation of 9.63E + 26, 
the modern record), are cases where hyperinflation was followed by political instability (Sargent 
1982). However, much more modest double-digit inflation has also been attributed as a key 
reason behind U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s defeat to Ronald Reagan in 1980. For a further 
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burden of non-floating rate (non-indexed) debt which has been issued in 
the domestic currency controlled by the central bank. 
 
6. Financial repression, when accompanied by a modest level of inflation, 
can play a significant role in reducing the government’s debt burden.30 
Financial repression, which is sometimes referred to as a ‘stealth’ tax31, 
can encompass a complex and opaque range of policies which are 
designed to provide the government with funding at preferential rates of 
interest. The regulations placed on the financial system which accompany 
financial repression, such as capital controls, are often unpopular. 
Previous research has also shown financial repression to have a negative 
impact on economic performance and growth.32 What constitutes 
financial repression is a source of ongoing debate.33  For example, 
‘prudential’ measures aimed at increasing the stability of the financial 
system, such as Basel III and Solvency II requirements for financial 
institutions to hold a higher percentage of ‘safe’ capital (e.g., sovereign 
instruments), have also been characterized as financial repression as they 
would force private firms to hold more government debt than they would 
otherwise.34 Last, like inflation surprise it is important to note that the 
debt reduction benefits of financial repression only work for debt issued 
in the domestic-currency.35 
 
7. Repudiation (also referred to as ‘default’36) has historically perhaps been 
the most common means for reducing unsustainable levels of sovereign 
debt.37  Default, however, is not without negative consequences for 
borrowers and lenders alike.38 Countries which have defaulted can suffer 
                                                                                                                                            
discussion of the history of inflation and hyperinflation see Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) pp. 180-
189. 
30 (Giovannini and Demelo 1993; Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011; Agénor and Montiel 2008; Beim 
and Calomiris 2001; Easterly 1989; Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel 1994) 
31 (Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011, p. 19) 
32 (Shaw 1973; McKinnon 1973; Goldsmith 1969; De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler 2007; 
Easterly 1993; Lanyi and Saracoglu 1983; Galindo et al. 2002; Roubini and Salaimartin 1992; 
World Bank 1989; Todaro and Smith 2003) 
33 (Turner 2011) 
34 Some have argued that the Federal Reserve’s and Bank of England’s quantitative easing 
programs, which have had the effect of keeping interest rates on U.S. and UK government debt 
securities low, constitute financial repression (Treadway 2012). Efforts aimed at restricting the 
actions of credit rating agencies have also been described as a novel form of financial repression 
(Evans-Pritchard 7 July, 2011). 
35 (Rogoff and Reinhart 2011) 
36 What constitutes a ‘default’ is a common source of confusion. For economic analysis, 
Grossman and Vay Huyck conceptually define default as “the failure to meet contractually 
agreed upon obligations in full”, such as the repudiation of debt or the failure to repay the loan 
on time (Grossman and Van Huyck 1988, p. 1088). They go on to note that “window dressing” 
is often employed to avoid legally classifying debts as in default for regulatory purposes. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) also define a certain level of inflation as constituting a default in real terms. 
37 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) 
38 (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003) 
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from a number of hardships, including reduced access to capital markets, 
sudden forced fiscal retrenchment, higher interest rates, and political 
turnover.39 While default often leads to significant losses, lenders often 
have enough leverage to enforce some level of repayment even if 
considerable time has passed since the default event.40 A common 
alternative to outright debt repudiation is the amendment of loan terms, 
earlier described as a form of financial aid. However, such ‘restructurings’ 
or ‘partial’ defaults can still constitute a technical default and will often 
result in more expensive and or restricted credit for countries in the future. 
 
A nation which finds itself with an unsustainable level of debt will almost 
always prefer to grow its way out of the problem (option 1). However, nations 
which are unable to achieve sufficient growth must consider one or more of the 
above six remaining mechanisms for achieving debt sustainability.  
  
                                                 
39 (Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz 1986; Bordo and Oosterlinck 2005; Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; 
Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; Eichengreen 1991, pp. 155-156; Cole, Dow, and English 1995) 
40 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, pp. 61-63) For example, following the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
Russia was only able to return to international capital markets after its Tsarist-era default from 
eight decades prior was addressed. 
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Internal and external political dimensions of debt 
sustainability 
Sovereign debt sustainability is as much a political as economic challenge. 
In particular, tension often develops between foreign and domestic creditors 
whose interests are frequently pitted against each other. The notion that ‘all 
politics is local’ is arguably the driving force behind the perception that foreign 
creditor interests are often subjugated to domestic ones. However, foreign 
creditors have not always quietly accepted their fate as losers in the often 
contentious battles over debt sustainability. For example, during the 19th century 
a ‘protectorate’ was established over Egypt by Britain to ensure payment on its 
credit.41 For debtors, the plundering of foreigners as a means of shoring up a 
nation’s finances extends back through the Viking raids to at least as early as 
Roman times. 
While the days of both creditors and debtors employing direct military 
force as a means for achieving financial objectives seem to have passed, the use 
of geopolitical leverage has continued into more recent times. For example, 
during the 1956 Suez Crisis the U.S. informed Britain that unless its military 
forces were withdrawn from engagement with Egypt the U.S. Treasury would 
sell its vast holdings of British sovereign debt. This was considered a significant 
enough threat to the financial stability of Her Majesty’s Government that British 
troops quickly departed the Sinai Peninsula.42 The Suez Crisis is often presented 
with a favourable view towards the American position and the power of the 
country’s financial leverage over Britain. However, from a debt-sustainability 
perspective, Britain’s military manoeuvres had the effect of increasing the value 
of holding British gilts in the eyes of the Americans. Such geopolitical deals are 
typically shrouded in secrecy and confirmable only decade’s after-the-fact when 
official records have been declassified. Nevertheless, such secrecy has not 
stopped contemporaries from speculating about present day events.43  
                                                 
41 (Coggan 2011, p. 252) In 1915 the U.S. managed a similar operation in Haiti. 
42 (Kunz 1991) 
43  For examples, there was recent speculation on a U.S.-European deal banning Iranian oil 
imports from several European countries facing debt sustainability challenges in exchange for U.S. 
support for additional IMF funds for those same European governments (Talley 2012). Limited 
U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan in exchange for China’s on-going purchase of U.S. Treasuries are 
another area of speculation. 
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Conclusion 
In order to achieve sovereign debt sustainability countries will often utilize 
more than one of the seven mechanisms described in this paper. While overly 
indebted countries often have economic similarities, optimal debt sustainability 
solutions must be tailored to a nation’s unique political and economic 
circumstances. In short, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to the challenge of 
debt sustainability.  
The degree to which any one of the sovereign debt reduction options can 
be influenced by policy varies, and in some instances market-driven debt 
dynamics may outpace official action. In considering the different policy 
alternatives a country must balance what is economically achievable against 
what is politically viable, while also considering the time available. 
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Figure 1: Public Debt-to-GDP (%) for G-20 Advanced and 
Emerging Countries 
 
 
 Source: International Monetary Fund. G-20 Advanced: Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom; G-20 Emerging: Argentina, Brazil, People's 
Republic of China, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa 
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Figure 2: Public Debt-to-GDP (%) for G-20 Advanced Countries, 
1880 - 2010 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund. G-20 Advanced: Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, United States, Germany, France, and United Kingdom. 
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Table 1: Mechanisms for Sovereign Debt Sustainability and 
their Political Economy Tradeoffs44 
 
  Mechanism Description      Advantages      Disadvantages 
1. Economic  
    Growth 
Growth of a nation's 
taxable GDP of 
sufficient size to 
service debt. 
+ Automatically generates 
increased tax revenue 
without higher tax rates 
+ High political support 
− Potentially difficult to 
achieve, particularly for 
highly-indebted economies 
− Opposition to growth 
2. Financial  
    Aid 
Bridge financing to 
enable economic 
growth. Debt 
forgiveness and or 
restructuring can also 
constitute aid. 
+ Large source of funds 
available internationally 
+ Can engender improved 
economic efficiency 
+ Expand foreign trade 
+ Rescheduling debt can 
be mutually beneficial 
− Rarely provided with no-
strings attached 
− Unpopular, difficult to 
implement debtor 
concessions 
− Aid arrives too late (‘throw 
good money after bad’) 
3. Fiscal  
    Adjustment 
Reducing government 
expenditure and or 
increasing tax 
revenue. 
+ Fiscal adjustments are 
within domestic control 
+ Avoidance of foreign 
commitments 
+ High transparency 
− Counter-growth and may 
lead to an ill-timed 
economic contraction 
− Politically unpopular 
− Implementation challenges  
4. Asset Sales The sale of 
government assets, 
such as state-owned 
enterprises, bullion, 
geopolitical influence, 
etc. 
+ Source of hard currency 
+ Liberalization may help 
boost economic growth 
+ May be reversible 
through later repurchase 
and or nationalization 
− May only reduce debts by 
small fraction 
− Reduce government 
revenue generating assets, 
exacerbating problem 
− Slow; 'fire-sale' prices 
5. Inflation  
    Surprise 
Unexpected spike in 
inflation, triggered by 
the government, 
which reduces the 
real debt burden. 
+ Quickly reduces the real 
value of debt 
+ Can be implemented at 
government’s discretion 
− May trigger capital flight, a 
currency crisis and 
hyperinflation 
− Severe political instability 
− Only reduces debt issued 
in domestic currency 
6. Financial  
    Repression 
A system of controls 
and interest rate caps, 
accompanied by 
modest inflation, 
which reduces the 
real value of 
sovereign debt. 
+ Can deliver a steady 
reduction in the real 
value of the debt over 
time 
+ Historically compatible 
with economic growth 
+ Low transparency 
− Reduced economic 
efficiency 
− Complex implementation 
and enforcement (e.g., 
black markets) 
− Slower than alternatives 
− Low transparency 
− Only reduces debt issued 
in domestic currency 
7. 
Repudiation 
    
Suspension and/or 
cancelation of 
principal and or 
interest owed to 
creditors. 
Restructuring of 
certain loan terms, 
such as the 
repayment schedule, 
may also constitute 
default. 
+ Quickly reduces debt 
+ Debtor can target 
repudiation of certain 
creditors (e.g., 
foreigners) 
+ Debate over the degree 
of negative 
consequences for debtor 
(e.g., capital markets 
access) 
+ A common approach 
− Reduced access to capital 
markets 
− Higher interest expense 
going forward 
− Only partial repudiation is 
typically possible 
− Restructuring still 
constitutes a default and 
has negative consequences 
                                                 
44 Except economic growth the seven mechanisms are not ranked in any particular order of 
attractiveness. 
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